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This chapter is divided into four parts. The first establishes a conceptual
framework, termed the ‘frontier economy’, through which TPA issues relevant to
Aboriginal consumers and businesses can be explored. The second part of the
chapter explores some of the ‘special characteristics’ of Aboriginal consumers that
potentially increase their vulnerability to commercial exploitation. Moving from
consumers to Aboriginal communities, part three examines factors that may inhibit
the operation of competitive markets in remote Aboriginal communities, with
reference to the operation of community stores. Finally, part four of the chapter
returns to the concept of the ‘frontier economy’ and to the question of Aboriginal
agency, and discusses the implications of these for ACCC compliance and
education strategies.
The focus on community stores
A community store is defined here as a store run under Aboriginal control and
located in a remote Aboriginal community. A large proportion of stores in remote
Aboriginal communities fit this definition, in that they are owned and governed by
Aboriginal bodies. Community stores are central institutions in remote Aboriginal
communities, for a number of reasons. The store is often the main socioeconomic
enterprise in the community (Roberts 1994: 5), and the main provider of food for
many people (both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal) in the community. Moreover
community stores are often the only providers of banking services (see Altman,
McDonnell & Ward 2001: 11–12). Community stores thus provide an excellent
case study for examining the ways Aboriginal businesses operate in an Aboriginal
domain and how this may differ from commercially operated businesses in the
non-Aboriginal economy. Where appropriate, the operation of community stores
will be contrasted with the operation of other types of stores located in or around
remote Aboriginal communities, for example, pastoral station stores.
The operation of competitive markets in remote Aboriginal communities is
circumscribed by structural impediments, in particular transport costs, problems of
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governance, the cultural context, labour costs associated with remoteness, and
land rights legislation (see Altman, McDonnell & Ward 2001). All of these factors
impinge upon the operation of community stores as economic enterprises, and on
competitive markets in remote Aboriginal communities more generally.
Competition theory postulates that where one or more firms exercise substantial
market power by raising prices, other firms will be encouraged to enter the market.
However, there are a number of cultural and structural factors which militate
against the operation of mature competitive markets in discrete Aboriginal
communities on Aboriginal lands in the Northern Territory. Effective competition
has delivered benefits to most Australians, and the premise might be that it would
have the same effect in remote Aboriginal communities. This chapter explores the
complex reasons why such a premise is not self-evidently true.
Methodology
The remote Aboriginal communities visited during fieldwork included Yuendumu,
Yuelamu, Mutitjulu and Ntaria (Hermannsburg). Two pastoral station stores were
also visited. Interviews were conducted with the managers of community stores
and pastoral stations, members of store committees, presidents and clerks of local
councils, local business people, representatives from various community
organisations, and Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal members of communities.
Interviews were also conducted in Alice Springs with ATSIC Commissioner Alison
Anderson and a number of other ATSIC staff, George James (Alice Springs,
Department of Fair Trading) and Kevin Rolfe (Tangentyere financial counselling
officer) as well as employees from a range of accounting firms who provide
services to community stores. Additional brief fieldwork was conducted by Jon
Altman and David Martin in Maningrida (Arnhem Land) and Aurukun (Cape York)
respectively.
The methodology adopted is designed to provide the ACCC with an in-depth
analysis of a particular type of enterprise—the community store. Such research,
while limited in scope, elucidates some important conceptual and regulatory
implications for the ACCC. For example, one finding of this research has been the
diversity of experience and circumstance of Aboriginal consumers and businesses.
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Aboriginal people, in their choices and actions as consumers, bring to bear values
and practices  that derive their forms and meanings from the Aboriginal domain.
The chapter argues that some of the values that inform the choices and actions of
Aboriginal consumers are different from those of non-Aboriginal people. A number
of specific Aboriginal economic practices are identified and discussed: the
contextualisation of money, the establishment of particular forms of dependency,
demand sharing and personalised transactions.
An analysis of Aboriginal consumer welfare issues requires an understanding of
Aboriginal consumer practices. Any assumption that the behaviour of Aboriginal
consumers is the same as that of all other consumers may result in a
misunderstanding of the commercial relationships entered into by Aboriginal
consumers. In a worse case scenario it could result in an application of the TPA in a
way that disadvantages, rather than benefits, Aboriginal consumers. To ensure that
the TPA is applied in ways that benefit Aboriginal people, analysis of prospective
breaches of the TPA must be made with reference to the agency of Aboriginal
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A conceptual framework: the ‘frontier
economy’
By definition, a frontier marks a boundary or an intersection between two domains.
The ‘frontier economy’ describes the intersection between specific Aboriginal
economic values and practices, and those of the general market-based economy
(fig. 1). The conceptual space so created is the arena (spatial, social, political and
economic) within which the specific economic practices and values of Aboriginal
businesses (such as community stores) and Aboriginal consumers interact with
those of the wider market-based economy.
Fig. 1. The frontier economy
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consumers. Factors that may impinge on the agency must also be taken into
account. The experience of Aboriginal consumers, and consumers generally, will
differ depending on whether they live in a rural, regional or remote area, on their
level of education and income, and on whether they are employed or not and so on.
The frontier economy also provides a useful conceptual framework for examining
community stores, which operate in the zone of intersection between the
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal domains (see fig. 2). It is argued that the operations
of community stores in remote Aboriginal communities must be interpreted with
reference to their cultural context. In this section of the chapter, the exploration of
the cultural context of Aboriginal businesses includes a discussion of the
governance structure of stores. Such discussion is necessary for an understanding
of why the frontier economy may operate in a way that is different to the non-
Aboriginal economy. Martin (1995) posed the question as to whether enterprises
such as stores are primarily concerned with ‘culture business’ or ‘money business’.
That is, whether the cultural priorities of an Aboriginal community, such as
ensuring that revenue is distributed to traditional land owners on which the store is
located, are more important than making a profit.
Fig. 2. The frontier economy and Aboriginal businesses
It is important to note at this juncture that the ‘frontier economy’ is used both as
an analytical and as a heuristic device in this chapter to illustrate certain
characteristics of the engagement of Aboriginal people and businesses with the
wider Australian economy. It is not, however, designed to represent the wider
relationships between Aboriginal groups and societies and the general Australian
society, since this can be more accurately conceived of in terms of a complex,
contested ‘intercultural zone’ rather than the interaction between two distinct
societies (Merlan 1998).
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The term ‘frontier’ is used advisedly, because it has connotations both of regions
beyond the settled area, and of underdeveloped areas. The concept of the frontier
economy as used in this chapter is not necessarily geographically located solely in
remote areas, since distinct Aboriginal economic practices can be found in rural
and urban environments as well as in remote regions (see Macdonald 2000). It
may be that in identifying Aboriginal TPA-related issues, the particular
understandings and values that Aboriginal people bring to bear in their
engagement with the wider economy are more significant than their geographical
location.
While geographic ‘remoteness’ is not a defining characteristic of the frontier
economy, it may nevertheless be a contributing factor to the specific characteristics
of that economy in remote Australia. For example, Aboriginal consumers may be
more vulnerable to exploitation in remote as opposed to rural and urban areas,
partly because of their lower levels of literacy and numeracy. Additionally,
however, government institutions typically have a less effective presence in remote
regions, as manifested for example in relatively ineffective law enforcement in
remote Aboriginal communities. In the recent Cape York Justice Study, the Uniting
Aboriginal and Islander Christian Congress (UAICC) made a submission arguing
that in Cape York:
[t]here is a real issue about whether current policing practices and resources are
adequate. Overwhelmingly, community leaders have stated that the law is very ‘weak’
in that community. By this they mean that … law enforcement is weak (Cape York
Justice Study 2001: 180).
It is questionable whether regulation alone will guarantee consumer rights in
remote communities. In places where many government institutions are absent and
where law enforcement is relatively weak, effective monitoring of regulatory
compliance is necessarily compromised.
The argument in terms of the frontier economy is designed to alert readers to the
importance of the cross-cultural dimensions of the market’s operation in remote
Aboriginal communities. Analysis of TPA-related Aboriginal issues requires a
culturally-informed understanding of why Aboriginal people may continue to
participate in relationships that have the potential to be exploitative. A culturally
informed understanding of how Aboriginal businesses operate may suggest that
they are as concerned with cultural reproduction as financial viability. However, the
fact that businesses operate in the Aboriginal domain and are informed by specific
Aboriginal economic practices does not necessarily mean that they do not operate
in a competitive and efficient manner. In some instances it may be that the cultural
context of a business is an important asset as, for example, in Aboriginal art
production or tourism.
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1 There is provision in the TPA for the authorisation of anti-competitive conduct (s. 88),
where such conduct would be of benefit to society. Thus the test under this section is
Aboriginal consumers and the market
One specific aim of this research is to identify special characteristics of Aboriginal
communities that make individuals susceptible to commercial exploitation, and that
should be taken into account in any ACCC compliance or education strategies. This
section draws on findings from ethnographic studies of remote Aboriginal groups
to outline certain values and practices which Aboriginal people in such areas
typically bring to bear on their transactions in the market. A case study of the
operations of a remote pastoral station store is used to argue that certain
transactions may be both commercially exploitative and instances of instrumental
Aboriginal action, or agency. The implications of this argument for the ACCC’s
compliance and education strategies are discussed in the final part of this chapter.
The ‘informed consumer’
The underlying principles of the TPA are predicated upon the assumption that a
competitive market will benefit consumers in most instances.1  This is reflected in
the Act’s stated objective of enhancing the welfare of Australians through
promoting competition and fair trading and providing consumer protection.
Markets involve producers of goods and services, consumers of those goods and
services, and intermediaries such as wholesalers and retailers. Bruce suggests, in a
summary of the operations of the consumer protection aspects of the TPA, that
there is a tension between producers of goods and services and consumers. He
argues that:
[t]he tension exists because the producers generally want to make the goods or services
at the cheapest cost to themselves and make the best possible price return on those
products. Consumers on the other hand generally want to choose between as many
goods or services as they can and to buy them at the cheapest possible price to themselves.
The indication of this tension is price. Consumers use their buying power to send signals
to producers telling them what goods or services they think are worth spending money
on. In response to these price signals, producers then alter their production process to put
out the kinds of goods and services that consumers are willing to pay for (1999: 4).
Thus a properly functioning market requires not only competition between
producers and between suppliers, but also consumers for whom information about
price is one of the bases upon which purchasing behaviour is predicated.
Ultimately, then, certain assumptions are being made about human nature, or at
least about those aspects of it that pertain to the provision and obtaining of
market-derived goods.
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This part of the chapter does not argue that price is irrelevant to the purchasing
decisions of Aboriginal people in remote regions. However, it does suggest that it is
not enough to understand their typically vulnerable economic position solely in
terms of structural features of the market in remote regions, or poor literacy and
numeracy skills, or a lack of knowledge of their consumer rights—although these
factors are demonstrably present. Rather, it argues that Aboriginal people also
bring to their dealings with the market particular distinctive values and practices.
That is, the reality of Aboriginal agency has to be accepted in any analysis of
competition and consumer issues.
Put another way, it is argued here that Aboriginal people are ‘informed consumers’,
but typically much of the knowledge and many of the values which inform their
purchases of goods and services may be quite different from those of non-Aboriginal
consumers. While the focus here is on remote areas, there is also a body of
ethnographic evidence that suggests that distinctive Aboriginal values and practices
are not solely confined to traditionally oriented populations in remote areas.
Cash and consumer goods
In a market economy such as Australia’s, money integrates otherwise disparate
processes in a multitude of domains. It not only mediates, but serves to represent
relations between objects, and to objectify relations between persons. However,
within the Aboriginal domain in remote Australia at least, money’s capacity to
objectify relations in this manner is greatly attenuated, through what Sansom
(1988) in writing of Darwin Aboriginal fringe dwellers, aptly terms a resistance to
the ‘monetisation of the mind’.
For such Aboriginal people, whether or not cash is exchanged for access to others’
consumer goods, services or labour, and the amounts of cash involved in the
transactions, are dependent upon people’s own assessments of the social value
and context of the proposed transaction, rather than its formal economic value. As
one instance, a number of attempts have been made in past years by Wik
individuals and families in Aurukun in western Cape York to start small enterprises,
for example through selling candy, soft drinks and cigarettes. In all cases these
failed. The common factor was that the cash generated from sales was insufficient
to meet the costs of the goods to the enterprise. The overwhelming reason for this
was that it was not possible for those operating the enterprises to insist that goods
provided or booked down to kin be paid for.
As another example from the same region, whether money is offered, and how
much, for the use of another person’s vehicle or a boat for a hunting trip can
depend on a range of non-market factors (Martin 1993: 116–29). These include
the relationship between the parties (with the expectation and amount of payment
tending to increase with the social and kinship distance of the relationship), the
relative status of the two parties (particularly as established through kinship),
32 Competition and consumer issues for Indigenous Australians
c h a p t e r 3
whether the vehicle or boat owner has social or other debts owing to the other
party, and the amount of cash currently held by the person seeking the transport.
These exchanges of cash between individuals and groups, and the use of consumer
goods such as vehicles and boats, serve in part to establish and reproduce the
system of Aboriginal social relations, especially those relationships defined through
kinship. This social phenomenon is widely reported in the literature for Australian
Aboriginal groups (e.g. Macdonald 2000; Martin 1995; Peterson 1991; Sansom 1980).
In such systems, money is no longer the object of formal calculation governed by
the impersonal principles of the market place. On the contrary, it is transformed
within the Aboriginal domain, becoming more the subject of contingent social
calculation—what Schwab (1995) has aptly termed a ‘social calculus’—and a
means through which a distinctive order is stamped upon the world. This ‘cultural
logic’ not only operates within the Aboriginal domain, but is brought to bear by
Aboriginal people in their dealings with outsiders.
Similar principles operate with regard to consumer goods. For example, Gerrard
(1989) provides an analysis of the role of motor vehicles in an Arnhem Land
community in the flows of goods and services among kin, and between Aboriginal
people and outsiders, through a process of ‘humbugging’ or demand sharing (see
below). The assimilation of vehicles to distinctive Aboriginal modes of economy
and sociality amongst Warlpiri people of the central desert region has been clearly,
and wittily, shown in the Bush Mechanics documentary series, screened by the
Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC 2000). These films show that vehicles
are without doubt of high social utility, and are purchased from dealers in Alice
Springs through market transactions. However, the value Warlpiri men accord
them is not constructed against that established by the regional used-car market,
but in terms of their roles in primarily Aboriginal masculine pursuits such as
hunting, attendance at ceremonies, and visiting kin across a huge region.
Furthermore, ‘ownership’ and use of a vehicle is not confined to a single individual
or family, even if they were the original purchasers. Rather, vehicles provide focal
points around which important aspects of Warlpiri sociality are organised. That is,
for Warlpiri people, the value of vehicles is primarily socially determined within the
regional Aboriginal society, rather than commercially determined within the
regional or national market.
Conversely, there is ethnographic evidence that where possession of consumer
goods, even highly valued ones, adversely affects core Aboriginal values, steps
may be taken to ensure the primacy of the latter. Martin (1993) notes instances
among the Wik people of western Cape York Peninsula where vehicles and other
consumer goods are deliberately damaged or destroyed as part of an omnipresent
pressure against material and capital accumulation and its potential to establish
hierarchies. Similarly, Folds (2001) records instances of video recorders and other
such consumer goods being destroyed by their owners to prevent disputation over
their use amongst Pintupi people of the Western Desert.
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Despite the availability of cash and consumer goods on a hitherto unprecedented
scale, the evidence demonstrates that wealth for the Aboriginal people of such
regions continues to lie primarily in social forms of capital. This is especially the
case with social connections defined through kin and section relationships, and
cultural forms of capital, such as connections to traditional country, and ritual
status and knowledge. Ultimately that which is accumulated, managed and
contested in the Aboriginal domain is not so much material forms of capital as
social capital (Martin 1995). Cash and consumer goods have become incorporated
into the Aboriginal domain as core means through which particular forms of social
capital can be realised. The values and practices that inform that domain are
brought to bear in Aboriginal people’s transactions in the market. The chapter now
briefly turns to explore this issue.
Seeking dependency
Particular concerns may arise in situations where there is a high degree of
inequality between the transactors in a market. This will often be the case for
Aboriginal consumers from remote communities, who may have a poor command
of English, be largely illiterate and innumerate, and live in relatively impoverished
circumstances. In these cases, the Aboriginal consumer may be dependent upon
the knowledge, skills, honesty and goodwill of the provider of the particular good
or service. These relationships may be long-term, for example between the owners
and customers of the pastoral station store discussed below. However, it can not be
assumed that such dependency flows solely from the relative inequality in market-
relevant skills, knowledge and competence between Aboriginal people and the
providers of goods and services. On the contrary, and paradoxically, dependency
may itself arise in part at least through Aboriginal agency.
There is a significant body of research which suggests that ‘dependency’, in terms
of a culturally established and validated capacity to demand and receive resources
and services from others, is a core principle through which Aboriginal agency is
realised in the structuring of social and economic relationships. This principle
operates both within contemporary Aboriginal groups and in the intercultural zone
between them and the wider society (see discussions in Anderson 1983, 1988a;
Finlayson 1991; Martin 1993, 1995; Myers 1986; Peterson 1993; Sansom 1980,
1988; Schwab 1995; Trigger 1992). Objective disparities in power and wealth can
be transformed by such Aboriginal agency through a process of co-opting others,
often outsiders (including non-Aboriginal people) to become patrons or ‘bosses’.
34 Competition and consumer issues for Indigenous Australians
c h a p t e r 3
Personalising ‘market’ transactions
It has been suggested that within the Aboriginal domain money is, in a sense,
personalised. Equivalently, Aboriginal people will actively strategise to incorporate
outsiders—taxi drivers, store managers, agency staff working in communities and
so on—into the world of Aboriginal ‘performative sociality’ (Martin 1993). By this
is meant a social universe in which relatedness is established through the flows of
cash, goods and services between people, and in which Aboriginal people actively
resist confining social relationships (including those with outsiders) to the terms of
their formal institutional roles.
For the Wik people of western Cape York Peninsula, for example, the term
‘customer’ does not refer to the market-based relationship of the purchaser of
goods or services, but to individuals in dyadic and personalised partnerships
involving exchanges of cash such as loans and gambling stakes. Reciprocity and
public sociability between the partners are both essential elements. Suggestively,
both partners in the relationship refer to each other as ‘customers’ (Martin 1993,
1995).
By incorporating significant others into their system of social relations, Aboriginal
people are attempting to subject them to their own system of obligations
constructed in terms of flows of goods and services. Thus, for example, by
establishing personalised relationships with a pastoral store manager, or a taxi
driver in Alice Springs, an Aboriginal person can (from his or her own cultural logic)
offer patronage, respect and amicable relations, and in return gain access to goods,
services and credit (through book-up).
A primary mechanism through which the flow of goods and services is realised is
what anthropologists (following Peterson 1993) have termed ‘demand sharing’,
and which Aboriginal people in central Australia call ‘humbugging’. Much
Aboriginal social transaction (particularly that involving access to material resources
such as the use of vehicles, food, tobacco, alcohol and cash) arises as the result of
demanding rather than of sharing. In demanding, an individual is asserting their
personal right (as a son, an aunt, a clansman and so forth) to a response from
others, but is also acknowledging, and thus through their actions substantiating,
their relationship with the other person (Martin 1995; Musharbash 2000; Schwab
1995).
Such demanding is not confined within the Aboriginal domain. One of the social
phenomena which non-Aboriginal staff in remote Aboriginal Australia find the
most difficult to deal with is the constant demands for access to resources such as
the use of vehicles, cash ‘loans’, booking down, and so forth. There is considerable
ethnography on this dynamic (e.g. Gerrard 1989; Martin 1995; Musharbash 2000;
Peterson 1993; Sansom 1980; Schwab 1995), but for the purposes of this chapter
it suffices to say that ‘humbugging’ does not just represent the incapacity of the
Aboriginal individual to manage his or her financial affairs, nor does it reflect an
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uninhibited desire for material goods as such. Rather, it demonstrates a process
through which access to valued resources is established through a particular form
of Aboriginal instrumental action where relationships are constructed in personal,
rather than market-based terms.
The implications of these arguments can be illustrated in a case study involving a
store run by a pastoralist in a remote location in the Northern Territory.
Case study: a remote pastoral station store
Small stores are operated by pastoralists in many areas of the Northern Territory. In
some cases, these stores service permanent Aboriginal populations living on
excisions within the station. In others, they provide competition to stores on major
Aboriginal communities in their region. While many pastoral stores focus on
Aboriginal customers, others also target the passing tourist trade.
A station store that services only the employees of the pastoralist falls under the
definition of ‘pastoral purposes’ as defined in the Pastoral Land Act 1992 (NT). On
the other hand, a store constructed on a main road with the intent of capturing
passing trade does not fall within the definition of ‘pastoral purposes’. Under s. 86
of the Pastoral Land Act, a pastoral lessee who wishes to use part of the lease for
a non-pastoral purpose may apply to the Pastoral Land Board for permission to do
so. Once a store becomes a successful stand-alone commercial enterprise, it is
expected that the pastoralist will apply to excise land from the lease as an
alternative tenure, a term Crown lease with a right to freehold upon completion of
development. An application for such an excision can be made by a third party,
with consent of the pastoral lessee. Relevant future act provisions of the Native
Title Act 1993 (Cth) have to be followed.
Information from the Northern Territory Cattlemen’s Association (B. Lee, pers.
comm.), suggests that permission to establish a store, as a non-pastoral purpose, is
not always formally sought. In any event, in contrast to the situation on Aboriginal
lands held under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth)
(ALRA), the legislation as such does not appear to raise structural impediments to
the establishment of small retail operations on pastoral lease lands.
The following case study concerns a pastoral store in a remote area of the
Northern Territory. A pastoralist and his family supplement their income
from their pastoral enterprise in relatively marginal cattle country, through
operating a store alongside the gravel road running past their homestead.
They have established a reasonably well–stocked store in quite substantial
premises. The store provides an income for the pastoralist without which, he
stated, the viability of his overall operation would be compromised. Almost
all the trade at this store involves Aboriginal customers. No Aboriginal
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people live on the freehold land where the store is located, so Aboriginal
people are travelling from three or four major communities (with stores)
located within a radius of several hundred kilometres, with some customers
travelling from outside the Northern Territory. This prompts the question:
why are Aboriginal people prepared to travel such long distances to use the
store?
At the time of our visit, no prices were marked, either on the goods
themselves or on the shelves. The store operated an EFTPOS system
through the till, and we observed that a significant number of keycards were
held behind the counter. We were also advised that the store held PIN
numbers for some of the cards. The store manager readily acknowledged
that this created considerable potential for exploitation, and that the probity
of the system depended upon the honesty of himself and his family. The
store also operated a book-up system, with a sliding scale of charges
according to the amount purchased on credit. A sign above the till stated
the charge as $9 for up to $50 credit, $11 for up to $100 credit, and
thereafter $9 for each additional $100 credit.2
Certain of these practices would seem to be undesirable, and some may
even fall under the ‘unconscionable conduct’ provisions of the TPA. Bruce
(1999: 28) has identified two themes underlying case law on the
unconscionable conduct provisions of the TPA:
! an unequal relationship exists in the sense that one of the parties is
under a special disability by virtue of age, infirmity, illiteracy or lack of
education
! the stronger party is aware of the disability and then exploits it to his or
her advantage.
It could be argued that these elements are present in the situation outlined
above. However, there is another set of factors in this complex situation,
which relate to the question of Aboriginal agency; that is, the instrumental
actions of Aboriginal people in accordance with particular values and
understandings.
The store does not have a captive market. All consumers travel large
distances to use the store and, further, this store is competing with the
2 Until recently such fees may have fallen outside the Uniform Consumer Credit Code
(UCCC) provided that they did not cover lending for a period of less than 62 days.
However, the code has just been amended to cover pay-day lending (i.e. lending a
small amount of money repayable on the customer’s next pay-day). It may be that
these provisions may also cover the fees on borrowing charged by community stores.
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larger ones operating at all of the communities from which its customers
come. Far from being a disincentive for reasons of high fuel costs and the
time involved, travel itself can involve other valued activities such as visiting
country, hunting, and maintaining contact with relatives over an extended
region. Also, people can exercise some choice as to who travels with them
to the pastoral store, and thus reduce the demands from relations on their
cash while actually shopping (see also Musharbash 2000: 59–60). By leaving
their keycards with the storekeeper, Aboriginal people can avoid the all-
pervasive ‘humbugging’ for cash from relations, particularly on those days
when wages or pensions are known to be deposited electronically into
accounts, and they may also accumulate savings. The store’s customers are
thus clearly exercising choice.
Furthermore, this particular pastoralist has lived in the area for some
fourteen years, and knows most Aboriginal people of the region by name.
While pragmatic in his attitudes, he also appeared to demonstrate
knowledge of, and respect towards, particular distinct Aboriginal values and
practices; for example, by his own acount, he took active steps to protect
Aboriginal people passing through on ceremonial business from unwanted
scrutiny by outsiders.
It transpired that there were no Aboriginal customers at the store at the time
of our field visit, and so it was not possible to ascertain directly their own
views of the situation. Nonetheless, it would be reasonable to assume, on
the evidence available to us, that Aboriginal customers have established a
particular form of mutuality with the storekeeper and his family, in which
they structure certain of their financial and purchasing dealings through
personalised rather than market-derived relationships. The store therefore
arguably operates in a complex ‘intercultural space’ (Merlan, 1998), in
which both Aboriginal agency and (possibly) undesirable or even
unconscionable sales practices are features.
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Competitive markets in remote Aboriginal
communities
The purpose of the TPA is to enhance ‘the welfare of Australians through the
promotion of competition and fair trading and provision of consumer protection’
(s. 2, TPA). Competition can be defined as the pressure that firms exert on each
other when acting independently to achieve the maximum amount of profit. The
degree of actual or potential competition in a market determines the market power
of firms.3  Corones (1999: 85) notes that ‘[m]arket power, whether possessed by a
single firm or firms acting collectively, is a measure of the ability of firms to harm
consumers through excessive prices, inferior products and poor service’. Thus a
market may be non-competitive if there are only one or two firms in the market
such that each can exercise a large degree of market power. In addition, barriers to
entry to the market will also restrict competition. These may include legislative
barriers that place restrictions on entry into the market, and structural barriers such
as the high start-up costs of entry. Finally, differential access to information on the
part of the buyer and seller of a good in a market, termed ‘asymmetries of
information’, can also result in markets operating non-competitively.
In standard economic theory, a number of benefits flow to consumers in a market
which is competitive. Competitive markets are viewed as efficient ‘in terms of
producing goods and services at the lowest average cost of production and
producing the goods and services that consumers value the most’ (Corones 1999: 5).
Recognising the benefits that flow to consumers in a competitive market, the TPA
includes a number of provisions designed to promote competition (in particular
Part IV s. 45–50). Acquiring market power is not illegal in itself, but misuse of
market power for anti-competitive purposes is (s. 46). However, the ACCC may
authorise conduct which may otherwise breach its anti-competitive provisions on
the basis that it is of public benefit (under s. 88).
One aim of this research is to identify special characteristics of Aboriginal
communities which inhibit competitive processes from delivering benefits enjoyed
by other communities (market failure), and which should be taken into account in
ACCC compliance or education strategies. As the key enterprises in remote
Aboriginal communities, community stores provide an excellent case study for
examining the operation of competitive markets. Factors that have been identified
as barriers to the operation of competitive markets in remote Aboriginal
communities, as exemplified by community stores, are:
3 The definition of a market is contained in s. 4(E) of the TPA, which provides that: ‘[a]
market means a market in Australia and, when used in relation to goods and services,
includes a market for those goods and services and any other goods and services that
are substitutable for, or otherwise competitive with, the first mentioned goods and
services.’
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! structural impediments, and in particular high transport costs
! the limited number of stores in remote areas in general, and Aboriginal
communities in particular
! problems of governance which prevent the efficient operation of stores and
may also operate as a barrier to the entry of new stores
! the cultural context of community stores (see Altman, McDonnell & Ward
2001)
! high labour costs in remote communities
! land rights legislation which may also operate as a barrier to entry of firms
onto Aboriginal land.
The following section will discuss each of these factors in general terms, before
focusing on the fieldwork conducted on remote Aboriginal community stores.
The market power of community stores
The higher prices charged for goods in some community stores could be indicative
of a number of factors.4  It could be that higher prices reflect structural
impediments or other problems in the operation of stores (discussed below), but it
is equally possible that they reflect, at least in part, the market power of
community stores. While higher prices are not, in and of themselves, a breach of
the TPA, abuse of market power is (in accordance with Part IV, s. 46).
Most community stores have a high degree of market power either as the only
provider, or as one of a few providers of goods to their community. Even where
there is more than one store in a community they are not necessarily acting as
competitors. For example, in Yuendumu there are two stores. Food and goods are
purchased mainly from the larger community store. Another much smaller corner
4 Prices charged for goods are the focal point for most discussions of the operation of
remote community stores. Both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people often express
concern at the prices charged at their local community store. Wells (1993: 160) notes
that ‘pricing policy is an especially important issue at a broad based community level’.
There are numerous accounts of the high prices charged for goods in remote
communities relative to urban centres (Crough & Christopherson 1993; Sullivan et al.
1987; Leonard 1998). Recent studies conducted by the NT Government’s Health
Service indicate that the cost of a basket of goods in most remote community stores in
the NT relative to the equivalent basket of goods purchased in Darwin was 28 per cent
higher (THS 2000: 8). While there are a number of limitations in these studies (see
Altman, McDonnell & Ward 2001: 5–6) there is a substantial body of evidence that
prices in remote communities are higher than in urban centres.
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store also provides some food and a limited number of goods. Competition
between the two stores is minimal. While the smaller corner store has seen an
increase in demand for its goods, mainly because its prices are lower than the
larger community store, its small physical and stock-handling capacity mean that it
is unable to meet the needs of a population of some 800 people. Moreover,
fieldwork indicated that even where there are two stores operating, agreements
may be made between them so that they do not operate in direct competition with
each other over certain products. Thus, for example, in one community there is an
understanding between store managements that one store will handle sporting
goods, shoes and clothes, while the other will handle petrol and stock goods for
tourists. While this may not be an explicit ‘arrangement’ it may lead to a lessening
of competition in markets for certain products and as such it may be considered an
‘understanding’ which contravenes s. 45 of the TPA. On the other hand, it may be
argued that in situations where (as is typically the case) community stores have a
limited operating capital base, certain public benefits may be served by ensuring
competition in the supply of essential items such as foodstuffs, and limiting it in
relation to other non-essential goods. This will particularly be the case where the
curtailment of such arrangements would result in the closure of one store, leaving
a monopoly.
Market power is also defined in terms of access to other markets, both spatially
and over time (Australian Meat Holdings v TPC; Re Queensland Co-operative
Milling Association Ltd; Re Defiance Holdings Ltd). In terms of the TPA definition
of a market, the geographic scope of a market takes into account whether
consumers can access another market. For example, the distance to the next store
would be a relevant factor. If a community store is the only store within a 500-
kilometre radius, access to other stores is unlikely to be a constraint on its market
power. Sheer distance confers a monopoly; without access to other markets a
population will become dependent on purchasing goods from the community
store. Monopoly in its turn allows the charging of high prices, some component of
which may also reflect the increased transport costs associated with distance from
major centres.
The limited access of remote Aboriginal communities to markets is also seasonally
dictated: this is a temporal dimension of market power. For example, Yuendumu,
Maningrida, Ntaria and Aurukun are all isolated by flooding at certain times of the
year, so that basic goods either have to be flown in or, for the coastal communities,
brought by barge. Thus stores in most of these markets operate as the only
providers of goods for certain times of the year.
The market power of community stores is also indicated the dependence of certain
sections of the community on goods provided by  them, particularly the elderly
and those with limited access to transport. For those groups the community store
becomes an essential provider of basic goods including food, water, clothes and
blankets. They constitute, in effect, a captive market. The failure of the community
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store to meet these basic needs, as well as increased prices on basic foodstuffs, can
impact seriously on vulnerable sections of the community.5
Aboriginal people in remote Aboriginal communities appear to be more dependent
on community stores than local non-Aboriginal people. Interviews conducted
during the fieldwork indicate that non-Aboriginal people, with their generally
higher socioeconomic status, can afford to order food and goods directly from
distant service centres, and have them freighted or flown in. This practice is noted
by Altman (2001) in Maningrida, where local non-Aboriginal residents often buy
items from Darwin and have them delivered by air or barge. Finlayson (1997: 11)
notes that in one remote Queensland community, ‘[i]nstead of shopping locally on
a needs basis, each [non-Aboriginal] household organises a three-month “bush
order” of fresh fruit, vegetables and meat, together with dry goods to be delivered
by barge from a regional centre’. One of the reasons that non-Aboriginal people
are able to shop in such large amounts while Aboriginal people tend not to is that:
[a]ll non-indigenous houses had domestic freezers … By contrast, few Aboriginal
houses had refrigerators, let alone freezers and most domestic cooking was replaced by
daily buying of food from the community ‘take away’ (1997: 11–12).
Based on her research Finlayson concludes that:
almost without exception, no non-Aboriginal staff shop at the community store … In
this way they were able to avoid the high prices and questionable quality of goods in
the community store (1997: 11).
Access to transport is another reason that non-Aboriginal people may be less
dependent on community stores than the Aboriginal population in remote
communities. Most non-Aboriginal people in communities either have their own
car, or have access to a car by way of their occupation. This allows them to visit
other stores within a region, as well as the regional service centre. For Aboriginal
people connections with non-Aboriginal locals, and particularly those with access
to a car, becomes an important resource. There are non-Aboriginal service staff
who make frequent visits between service centres and remote communities, and
non-Aboriginal residents of communities can, and often do, take advantage of this.
For example, a non-Aboriginal woman employed in the medical centre in
Yuendumu made the comment that she often asked colleagues coming from Alice
Springs to pick up pre-ordered packages of groceries for her.
5 How much it will impact on a community will depend, in part, on the degree of self-
provisioning activities, such as collection of bush foods, that community members
engage in (see Altman, McDonnell & Ward 2001: 6). It will also depend on the ability
of community members to obtain provisions from other stores outside the region, either
directly themselves, or through family members.
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Demand inelasticity
One indicator of the dependence of the community, and in particular certain
sections of the community, on goods provided by stores can be seen in the
inelasticity of demand for some items. If demand for a good is inelastic then
increases in the price of a good will not proportionally affect the quantity of the
good that is demanded. For example general consumer demand for cigarettes is
relatively inelastic. A large body of anecdotal evidence exists to suggest that
Aboriginal demand for some items may be relatively inelastic (see Martin 1993,
1998). For example, Wells quotes McMillan, the director of the Arnhem Land
Progress Association (ALPA) between 1988 and 1992, as saying:
The Aboriginal customer will pay almost anything for something they want. Conversely
if they do not want something you cannot give it away. A recent example in one of our
shops was a table of dresses to clear at $2.00 each, without one sale—this would never
happen in the urban centres of Australia (1993: 160).
During interviews a number of store managers commented on the relatively
inelastic demand for certain items. For example, store managers at Yuelamu
described the demand for ‘mink blankets’ as so great that they ‘could charge
anything’ for them. Part of the reason that demand is so high is that in addition to
their obvious uses, in many Aboriginal communities around central Australia
blankets have an important ceremonial role in ‘sorry business’.
Inelastic demand for certain items may make the Aboriginal populations of remote
communities vulnerable to price exploitation. This vulnerability is compounded by
low levels of literacy, which lead to dependence on the pictorial, brand-label
representation of certain goods. McMillan notes that:
Brand loyalty is very high, but this is probably a reflection of literacy levels rather than
product preference. If tea comes in a blue packet you don’t buy it in a yellow one. The
fact that one is Bushells and one Liptons is beside the point (1991: 283).
During interviews a number of store managers detailed experiences of products no
longer selling because companies changed their packaging. They also considered
that Aboriginal customers were less likely to buy the generic brands of some
products because of loyalty to particular brands, an experience supported by
McMillan (1991: 283) who states that, ‘[l]iteracy and product recognition by
colour limit [ALPA’s] ability to market generic house brands’.
McMillan’s ALPA experience suggests that the relative inelasticity of demand for
some items may mean that Aboriginal people could fall prey to exploitative pricing
on some goods (McMillan 1991). Advertising may in some cases reinforce brand
loyalty; Wells (1993) expresses the view that people respond quickly to advertising
for particular products. Advertising seems particularly evident in Aboriginal
consumers’ preference for brand name items. During fieldwork it became apparent
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that many Aboriginal consumers, like consumers generally, were particularly
attracted to ‘high status’ brand names. Brand-named clothes such as Nike and
Adidas are popular amongst young people as well as clothes that depict black stars
(like the rap artist Tupac). Amongst older men Levi jeans, RM Williams boots,
Moleskin pants and Akubra hats are popular. While these clothes were relatively
expensive, given people’s generally small incomes, other non-brand clothes were
seen as markedly inferior or ‘rubbish’ clothes.
Structural impediments to competition
The key question is whether the higher prices charged in community stores are
indicative of structural impediments rather than a reflection of market power. The
primary reason given in the literature for the failure of markets to operate
competitively in remote communities is the role played by structural impediments.
For example, the high prices found in remote community stores are often
attributed to high transportation costs. Another impediment identified in the
literature is the small populations of many isolated Aboriginal communities and
associated diseconomies of scale (Legislative Assembly of the Northern Territory
1999).
There are obvious links between high transport costs and a lack of competition in
transport services to rural and remote communities. Young argues that:
On the whole store managers have little chance of reducing their freight costs by
bargaining with rival firms because few operators serve their region. On the contrary,
managers may have to go to some length to persuade carriers to come out to them,
and may have to accept terms with little argument (1984: 44).
During fieldwork most store managers indicated that they were dependent on a
single transport provider, and this is suggestive of an uncompetitive freight market.
By contrast, competition among transport providers clearly has a positive impact on
the cost of freight. Recent fieldwork conducted by Altman (2001) suggests that the
increase from one to two barge operators to Maningrida, has fostered a higher
level of competition and resulted in lower transport costs and cheaper prices in
Maningrida’s community stores.
Data collected during fieldwork suggests that while transport costs may be an
impediment to the efficient operation of community stores it is not particularly
significant. A more important impediment may be the governance structures of
stores (discussed in greater detail below). The importance of governance, as
opposed to transport, to the efficient operation of community stores is evident in
data which details the cost structure of community stores handled by Deloitte
Touche Tohmatsu (henceforth Deloittes) in Alice Springs. In the years 1995 and
1998 Deloittes provided accountancy services for 11 stores, and by 2000 this
number had increased to 15. The information detailed by Deloittes represents a
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benchmark, or average, cost structure for all community stores handled by
Deloittes in central Australia.
According to Deloittes the average community store operates on a cost structure
that is only nominally profitable (see table 1). For example, in 2000, community
stores in the Deloittes sample with an average turnover of $1 038 619 returned a
net profit of only 3.5 per cent. In addition, while the expected gross profit for
businesses is usually one-third of turnover (or 33 per cent), the community stores
in the Deloittes sample recorded a gross profit of between 29.8 per cent (in 1998)
and 30.5 per cent (in 1995). The Deloittes accountants attributed this to managers
who failed to process or receipt goods that had been taken from the store,
unrecorded stock spoilage, and the provision of loans to community store
committee members.
Between 1995 and 2000 freight charges accounted for between 2.3 per cent and
3.8 per cent of costs relative to annual turnover. Store managers interviewed
during fieldwork estimated the cost of freight at between 2 and 5 per cent of
annual turnover. This can be contrasted to the mark-up policy detailed to us by
store managers and accountants of community stores, who indicated that most
stores mark up the price of goods by between 60 and 100 per cent, depending on
the type of good. This policy seems to indicate that the costs of freight are minimal
in the overall cost structure of most stores and do not seem to justify the generally
high prices that are found.
Store governance
In the context of this chapter, ‘governance’ refers to the processes and structures
through which communities and organisations are controlled and directed, and
necessarily involves questions of power, influence, and accountability. There are
two levels at which governance is relevant to this study. The first is the wider
structural level, as mediated through statutory regimes and institutions such the
ALRA (see discussion below), and the Aboriginal community government system
established under Part V of the Local Government Act 1993 (NT). The second is at
the level of the stores themselves.
Governance has long been identified as an issue of importance in relation to
community stores (see for example the Legislative Assembly of the Northern
Territory’s Inquiry into food prices 1999; George 1996; Young 1988, Young et al.
1993). Community stores are typically operated by incorporated associations with
Aboriginal boards (referred to as ‘store committees’). A study of remote stores
conducted by the Territory  Health Services (THS) of the Northern Territory (2000)
shows that the majority (66 per cent) of surveyed stores were owned either
through community-based associations or through other forms of Aboriginal
corporation (see table 2). In addition, community stores are often under Aboriginal
management to some degree. Table 2 indicates that of the stores surveyed nearly
half (48 per cent) had a store committee.
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Table 1. Average cost structure of remote central Australian
Aboriginal community stores 1995, 1998, 2000
1995 1998 2000
Account Av. ($) Av. (%) Av. ($) Av. (%) Av. ($) Av. (%)
Sales 1099427 100.0 1051392 100.0 1038619 100.0
Cost of sales
(excluding freight) 764063 69.5 737958 70.2 724785 69.8
Gross profit 335364 30.5 313435 29.8 313835 30.2
Other income
Interest received 2164 0.2 2680 0.3 2332 0.2
Other income 38056 3.5 6380 0.6 4654 0.4
Expenses
Admin. fees 964 0.1 266 0.0 140 0.1
Advertising 404 0.0 240 0.0 69 0.0
Audit & accounting 14652 1.3 15394 1.5 15004 1.3
Bad debts 3218 0.3 2956 0.3 6721 0.3
Bank charges 2373 0.2 3727 0.4 3307 0.2
Committee costs 1485 0.1 1659 0.2 1157 0.1
Depreciation 24294 2.2 36272 3.4 35056 2.2
Distributions & donations 38580 3.5 16788 1.6 14686 1.4
Electr., gas & water 13901 1.3 15914 1.5 14147 1.3
Freight 42228 3.8 24165 2.3 42228 3.8
Insurance 8113 0.7 8033 0.8 7403 0.7
Interest 2476 0.2 352 0.0 625 0.2
Legal costs 934 0.1 192 0.0 34 0.1
Manager’s expenses 5789 0.5 731 0.1 2315 0.5
Recruitment 375 0.0 - - 553 0.0
R & M 19014 1.7 12030 1.1 10790 1.7
Security 1031 0.1 556 0.1 342 0.1
Staff amenities 895 0.1 899 0.1 2088 0.1
Stock written off 2535 0.2 2288 0.2 4830 0.2
Superannuation 3683 0.3 6459 0.6 8072 0.3
Telephone, fax 4740 0.4 3494 0.3 4903 0.4
Travel & accomm. 2874 0.3 3662 0.3 4443 0.3
Wages & salaries 131644 12.0 123548 11.8 131491 12.0
Other expenses 12031 1.4 18227 1.5 27176 1.4
Total expenses 337300 30.7 293958 28.0 305343 30.7
Net profit 38284 3.5 28537 2.7 15478 3.5
Source: Data supplied by Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu in 2001.
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Table 2. Ownership and management structure of remote stores
in the Northern Territory, 2000
District East Alice Total no.
Darwin Katherine Arnhem  Springs Barkly of stores
Ownership
Community owned 9 10 3 4 2 28
Privately owned/leased 1 10 0 1 6 18
Aboriginal corporation 4 1 3 0 1 9
Not stated 1 1
Management
Store committee 10 9 4 3 1 27
Total stores surveyed 14 21 6 6 9 56
Source: THS 2000.
While the corporate structure of most community stores seems to indicate that
there is a high degree of Aboriginal management, in actuality community stores
are often run by non-Aboriginal managers. Young et al. write that while the
decisions relating to the five stores operated by ALPA were made, in theory, by an
Aboriginal board of directors, in practice this was not the case:
[i]n reality, technical matters such as those concerning stock ordering systems, dealing
with the transport services … developing training curricula and the methods for
delivering these, supervising the work of non-Aboriginal store managers and running
the financial and accountancy services, are dealt with by the Executive Director and
head office staff. Most of these are non-Aboriginal. Thus Aboriginal control in ALPA’s
day-to-day operations … is limited (1993: 7).
One of the reasons why Aboriginal community boards may fail to play a direct role
in the day-to-day running of stores is that they lack the necessary skills. Young et
al. write that the ‘Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal split in responsibility for policy and
technical matters is unlikely to change until Aboriginal people have been given the
opportunity to acquire the necessary technical skills’ (1993: 7). Technical skills are
important to the legal operation of community stores, and there may be a role for
the ACCC in educating store committees about the operation of the TPA (see
below).
Most community stores are operated by small corporations whose membership is
drawn from the community, and whose boards (typically called ‘store committees’)
are elected from that membership. While sound investment principles would
suggest the need for substantial reinvestment of profits in the business, store
committees are under considerable pressure to disburse the profits to community
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members. Whether or not the  community store profits are distributed, and to
whom, is often a contentious issue in communities. The store committee’s
difficulties in balancing cultural obligations with obligations to the wider
community become evident. Wells (1993: 156) writes that ‘[t]he dispersal of store
profits is probably one of the more problematical areas of store operation and
management’. In particular, this is a problem if large amounts of Aboriginal
community members’ money goes into the store (as is inevitably the case), and this
money is syphoned off to benefit only a few people. Wells writes:
In many cases, the store is the only independent economic enterprise in the community
and, because of this independence, can be used as a means to enhance the political
status and power of a particular family, clan or individual within the community (1993:
157–8).
Further, Wells adds that in this context:
[i]t is fairly unrealistic to expect that any profit arising from the business will not be
utilised by a small number of people (which is then distributed to their families) who
feel that they have some ‘right’ to these resources (1993: 158).
Other examples of the use of profits are community store-funded mini-buses or
barges (see Povinelli, 1993) and the use of profits to build a swimming pool or to
fund other local infrastructure. Elsewhere, store profits are paid directly to
community members as an annual dividend. For example the Yuelamu community
store distributed $500 to every Aboriginal adult member of the store during the
summer period, and $100 to every Aboriginal adult and child member of the
Yuelamu community at Christmas.
Dissent over distribution of profits, compounded by the high prices paid for food
and goods, has led to some stores looking at alternative pricing models. For
example, in 1992 the ALPA board of directors were presented with the option of
lowering profits and reducing prices, rather than distributing profits to the various
communities (Wells 1993: 170). A similar policy is currently being pursued by the
community store in Mutitjulu. The Mutitjulu community owns and operates the
highly profitable cultural centre enterprise located at Uluru (Ayres Rock). Recently
the Mutitjulu Council has directed that profits from the cultural centre be used to
cross-subsidise the price of goods in the community store. However, at present it is
unclear how successful this strategy has been, with fieldwork indicating that many
prices in the Mutitjulu community store remain higher than those in the
supermarket located at the nearby Yulara Resort.
One of the reasons that distribution of profits remains such a contentious issue in
remote communities is that there is often little or no accountability by the manager
to the store committee. In addition, there is often a lack of transparency in the way
the store is operated. For example the store committee and the general community
are often ignorant of the cost structure implemented or the profit made by the
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store. It may also be that some members of Aboriginal store committees receive
money in the form of indefinite ‘loans’ from the manager. Thus a symbiotic
relationship may arise between the store committee and the manager of the store,
which benefits the few while resulting in increased prices for the many. Deloittes’
data (see table 1) indicate that in 1995 the average amount of money paid by
community stores in ‘distributions and donations’ was $38 500. However, between
1995 and 2000 there has been a decline in this amount, and it is possible that,
with the increased accountability of stores associated with the introduction of the
GST, payments in ‘distributions and donations’ may continue to decline. Another
cost related to store committees is ‘committee costs’ or sitting fees paid to
members of the store committee, and ‘bad debts’. Deloittes’ data indicate that
these costs are, however, quite nominal, amounting to an average cost of
approximately $7000 in 2000.
The wages and salaries paid to the store manager and staff are also relevant to a
discussion of governance. Under the kind of symbiotic relationship discussed
above, store managers who have given a large number of ‘loans’ to committee
members have leverage to ensure that they have generous terms detailed in their
contracts. A lack of accountability and transparency in the operation of the store,
when combined with a store committee whose members have a poor
understanding of non-Aboriginal corporate governance requirements, can lead to
confusion over the salaried amount actually paid to staff. For example, in an
interview conducted during fieldwork, the chair of a store committee said that he
had no idea what the manager of the store was being paid, or even if a contract
between the store manager and committee existed. The manager has been
working in the store with a large staff of non-Aboriginal people for almost two
years, during which time all of the staff must have been paid. That the chair of the
committee, as the employer of these staff, is unaware of the amounts they are
being paid, is a demonstration of the stark contrast between the supposed legal
corporate governance structure of store committees and the way that most
operate in reality.
Governance and ‘culture’
The difficulty of balancing Aboriginal cultural obligations with the legal obligations
imposed under the general Australian legal system is a problem that plagues many
store committees. One example, detailed above, is the problems encountered in
the distribution of profits from community stores. Recognition of the need to
balance Aboriginal cultural and non-Aboriginal legal obligations can be seen, for
example, in the 1992 ALPA Annual Report which discusses the need to find an
appropriate ‘culture’ in which ALPA stores can operate:
We have now developed to a stage where it is difficult to decide whether ALPA is
operated by ‘Balanda’ [white] culture or ‘Yolngu’ culture. There is no doubt in the minds
of the directors and staff that ALPA is controlled by Aboriginal people for the benefit of
Aboriginal people, and just who those people are. The dilemma comes when it is
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necessary to structure ALPA in a form that complies with Balanda law … One of the
responsibilities we have as a board of directors is to work out a ‘Business culture’ that
runs a business with balanda skills where necessary, but for the benefit of Yolngu people
at all times … the struggle to find an authentic ALPA culture continues, and is a
constant challenge before us (Rawnsley 1992).
There are a number of reasons for the gulf between Aboriginal cultural and non-
Aboriginal understandings as to how stores should operate. First, the lack of
accountability and transparency in the operation of many community stores poses
a number of difficulties, as discussed above. Second, committees often do not
understand their rights and responsibilities under non-Aboriginal law, in particular
with respect to the accountability of store managers. Third, it appears that often
Aboriginal community members do not understand that they have rights as
members of the corporation that operates the store.
In theory, the corporate governance structures under which most community
stores operate ensure that members could take action over the ineffectual
management of a store. However, in reality, such action is unlikely to occur. Wells
writes that most Aboriginal people consider the operation of the ALPA stores to be
‘Balanda’ business over which they have no rights: ‘attempts to make community
residents aware that they all, theoretically, control the Association and that ALPA is
working for Aboriginal people have not been entirely successful’ (1993: 169). One
reason for the lack of awareness about members’ rights may be that in the past
many community stores were owned and controlled by non-Aboriginal people
(Wells, 1993: 169). As a result of this historical legacy:
The store has always been seen as a European institution, and ownership groups
continue to view it in that way, taking close notice of the ideas of European advisers
who work with them (Young 1984: 73).
Given this historical context it is not difficult to understand why many Aboriginal
people feel that they lack rights in the control of the store.
Aboriginal members of a community store may not feel entitled to exercise their
members’ rights because, in terms of customary law, the rights of traditional
owners (discussed later) should prevail. Often the latter are considered paramount
in the operation of businesses in Aboriginal communities. Wells notes that: ‘there is
a perception among Aboriginal people that they do not have a right to speak for or
control resources, be it a store, land or another enterprise, if they do not have
traditional rights/ownership to it’ (1993: 169). The governance structures of
community stores may take account of these obligations to traditional owners by,
for example, paying rent to them or appointing them to the store committee.
However, recognition of these traditional owner’s rights may further confuse the
issue of Aboriginal members’ rights.
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Finally, it may be that customary law concepts of access to knowledge also
influence Aboriginal people’s understanding of who has rights in relation to
community stores. Rights in Aboriginal society are often conferred on the basis of
differential access to knowledge. Personal authority, the authority of elders and the
integrity and autonomy of Aboriginal groups often depends on the control of land-
related knowledge through restrictions on its dissemination (Bird Rose 1994: 2).
Thus in some communities it may be thought that people with control over stores
have possession of certain knowledge that is not freely available to all. Wells writes
that:
there are particular ‘rights’ associated with having access to this [store] knowledge, to
being employed in the store, to becoming a director … ultimately it is the ALPA
Balanda hierarchy (which includes local store managers) who possess the most
knowledge and therefore power. There is a perception among Aboriginal people that
Balanda are hanging onto secret stories, that there is a ‘behind story’ which
storeworkers and the community in general do not have access to (1993: 169).
Wells’ account is supported by Harper, as quoted by Wells, who states that: ‘there
is a perception in the community that Yolngu do all the jobs but they don’t get the
underneath knowledge’ (Wells, 1993: 169).
It may be that lack of access to ‘store knowledge’ causes Yolngu people to feel that
they cannot control the store. The framing of ‘store knowledge’ as ‘restricted
knowledge’, if Wells is correct in her analysis, suggests that Aboriginal members of
ALPA neither understand their rights as members nor feel empowered enough to
exercise those rights.
The gulf between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal understandings may be framed in
terms of the frontier economy. Located within the frontier economy, Aboriginal
governance structures such as store committees and local councils have to balance
the obligations imposed upon them by the two domains of which they form the
intersection—the Aboriginal and the non-Aboriginal. They must thus meet the
demands of their Aboriginal constituency—the community elders, traditional
owners and their kin—and also those of the non-Aboriginal bodies to whom they
are accountable—auditors and accountants and a variety of statutory agencies.
While these obligations are not always conflicting, their import must be recognised
before any changes can be made to the way store committees currently operate.
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Fig. 3. Aboriginal governance structures such as store committees
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The argument that competition, in and of itself, can overcome the problems of
governance in community stores, fails to take account of the cultural context in
which they operate. This is not to deny the importance of introducing or
maintaining a degree of competition in remote Aboriginal communities, but TPA
provisions on anti-competitive behaviour do not provide the full answer. Some of
the more pressing problems of governance in community stores clearly lie outside
the purview of the TPA, but unless the governance structures of community stores
are improved, competition amongst stores cannot fully enhance consumer welfare.
Well-run community stores can have a positive impact on pricing, but poorly
managed and governed stores can result in consumers paying higher prices than
they would otherwise.
The socio-cultural context of stores
The practices of community stores must thus be interpreted with reference to their
cultural context. The continuing strength of Aboriginal social formations, and the
values that underpin them such as the importance accorded to kinship, have led to
a series of specifically Aboriginal economic practices. These values have far-
reaching impacts on the ways in which individual and household expenditure,
labour and business are viewed. In the Aboriginal domain the amount of money
exchanged for consumer goods or labour is often not dependent on their
economic value but rather on a contextual assessment of the social worth of the
proposed transaction (see above). Thus Aboriginal communities may evaluate the
success of a business less in terms of its commercial viability and more in terms of
its ability to generate social capital by, for example, enhancing social and political
relationships. Accordingly, resources are invested in enterprises that generate social
rather than material capital. Aboriginal business enterprises that are interpreted as
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failing in commercial terms, may work to produce wealth in the form of social
relationships and alliances (Martin 1995: 7–17).
The practice of demand sharing can also have a number of impacts on the
operation of Aboriginal businesses. Pressure is placed on business owners to share
not only their earnings but also any assets and equipment, such as cars, that the
business might own.
Demand sharing can also have implications for the Aboriginal staff working in
businesses such as community stores. Young et al. wrote that:
Aboriginal employees in stores can easily acquire the necessary technical skills but they
have to be able to use these in a situation where they are frequently subjected to
pressures of a more social nature. The difficulties which Aboriginal check-out operators
in Australia face when confronted by relatives with supermarket trolleys filled with
goods which they cannot afford to pay for is only one example of such pressures
(1993: 8).
A further example of pressure being placed on Aboriginal staff is offered by Ellanna
et al.:
Young women are particularly vulnerable in this way, both because of age and gender.
Loss of stock in Aboriginal retail stores, where most check-out operators are young
women, can be partly attributed to older men taking advantage of their powerful
position in the community (1988: 60).
A number of community stores have developed strategies for helping staff to deal
with demand-sharing pressure. Wells (1993: 163) reports that ALPA has developed
a system, called ‘family law’, in which at the request of an Aboriginal staff member
or manager the staff member is removed from the check-out and given other
duties while their family is in the store. In addition, the presence of in-store video
cameras which record check-out transactions, such as are found in the Maningrida
stores, can stop pressure being placed on staff by family members.
Aboriginal hierarchies of power and authority may at times conflict with the
business hierarchy of the store, as when the authority held by elderly family
members (and based on traditional knowledge) is used to over-rule the business
decisions of younger, more commercially educated, kin (see Young 1988: 184–7).
Ellanna et al. also refer to this type of conflict:
[s]ince many of those involved in the financial and management sides of enterprise
operation are younger, more highly educated members of the community it follows that
their authority may frequently be over-ruled by their older kin, and they may feel
obliged to hand on benefits to the detriment of the commercial side of the business
(1988: 60).
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Conflicts affecting the practice of Aboriginal business can also arise from the
relationships between individuals or groups and areas of land. The traditional
owners of an area of land often have the responsibility and right to control activity
within that area. In recognition of these rights the Aboriginal owners of the land
that a business is located on often receive ‘royalty’ or ‘rent’ payments. This is an
established practice particularly in the Northern Territory (and is discussed in
greater detail below).
Relationships to land are also significant in determining the appropriate management
structures for businesses, not only in obvious examples such as cattle stations, but
also for any enterprise located on Aboriginal land (Young, 1988: 184–7). In
practice the result can be the domination of the business by land-owning groups,
or the creation of irreconcilable conflicts that result in the replacement of
Aboriginal business owners with non-Aboriginal operators (Peterson 1985: 90).
Land rights legislation
It can be argued that land rights legislation forms one, albeit not determinative,
statutory barrier to the operation of fully competitive markets in remote Aboriginal
communities. For example, in the Northern Territory many Aboriginal communities
are located on Aboriginal land that is inalienable freehold title granted under the
ALRA. The following discussion will concentrate on the ALRA, since it is currently
the most extensive form of land rights accorded to Aboriginal people in Australia.
Under s. 23 of the Act a land council must consult with traditional owners and
other affected Aboriginal people before it can approve a grant of interest in
Aboriginal land, including for the establishment of a business on Aboriginal land.
This can be contrasted with the situation of pastoral station stores (detailed above),
in which there seem to be few legislative barriers to the establishment of stores.
Land rights legislation may represent a significant legislative barrier to entry for
certain types of business. In accordance with the Act, different legislative
requirements must be met, dpepnding on the type of business. If the business
involved requires simply entering Aboriginal land, as in the case of the sale of
insurance premiums, then a permit to enter Aboriginal land will be required (see
s. 70 ALRA). This permit requirement applies to all people visiting Aboriginal
communities for work or any other purpose, on a short or long term basis (Central
Land Council (CLC) 2001). Permits are provided through regional land councils
that seek approval for permits from the community councils. Governance issues are
thus significant in decisions about the granting of permits and leases.
There have been cases in the Northern Territory where a community council,
becoming dissatisfied with a store manager’s performance, has revoked that
person’s permit and required them to leave Aboriginal land. During fieldwork a
number of store managers expressed dissatisfaction at the uncertainty of working
in an environment where they could be forced to leave in this way. The provisions
of the ALRA may thus work to discourage good quality applicants from accepting
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employment in Aboriginal communities (but they may also work to discourage
those who would seek to exploit Aboriginal communities).
If the business involved requires a permanent location in a community then this
will require that a lease be entered into with traditional owners (in accordance with
s. 19, ALRA). Usually this lease will also include a provision for payment of rent to
traditional owners whose land the business is located on. For example, Altman
(2001) reports that in Maningrida both the Maningrida Progress Association and
Bawinanga Aboriginal Corporation stores pay rent to traditional owners via the
Northern Land Council, in recognition of their location on Dekurdiji clan lands.
Similarly, when the community store in Ntaria was built, the business entered into a
contract for a 20-year lease, agreeing to pay rent to traditional owners. Rents paid
to traditional owners vary, and are arrived at through bargaining between
traditional owners and the store committee. Fieldwork data suggest that amounts
paid to traditional owners are often quite nominal in absolute terms, but may be
substantial in the light of people’s extremely low incomes. For example, in Ntaria
the rent paid to all traditional owners amounts to $4500 per clan group per year. In
Maningrida amounts paid to traditional owners, in the form of subsidised rent
(traditional owners on CDEP pay only $4 per fortnight rent, as opposed to other
CDEP participants who pay $20 per fortnight), are more generous but still amount
to only $416 per person per year.
Finally, evidence suggests that traditional owners have rejected applications from a
number of prospective businesses. For example, the Central Land Council has
indicated that a number of tourism proposals have been rejected by traditional
owners on the ground that they were culturally inappropriate (pers. comm. Tony
Keyes). The right of traditional owners to reject applications is a potential barrier to
competition. In communications with the CLC, it was indicated that traditional
owners who were already receiving rental payments from a community store might
not be supportive of the idea of another store acting as competition to it (pers.
comm. Tony Keyes). It is admittedly not uncommon in many jurisdictions (even
cities) to have to obtain necessary permits prior to operating a particular business
on certain land. However, in general the process of the granting (or otherwise) of a
permit in such jurisdictions is expected to follow reasonably transparent and
codified principles, such as those contained in planning laws. This is not the case in
remote Aboriginal communities.
Even where community stores are established and have been in operation for an
extended period of time, they can face a number of difficulties in relation to rent
paid to traditional owners. Wells offers an example of the problems faced by a
number of ALPA stores with rental payments. She notes the comments made at the
1984 ALPA annual meeting:
Traditional landowners, by the law, are entitled to some rent, and this must be fixed
once and for all, so that everyone is happy with what is happening. We have talked
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with NLC [Northern Land Council] on what is a fair rent to pay. This committee must
try and work out a plan that is fair to ALPA … there [are] a number of skills that
Aboriginal people have which Balanda do not have, and deciding on rent to landowners
is one of those skills (Wells 1993: 164).
The meeting resolved that rent would be paid to traditional owners (for the land)
and the Council (as owners of the store building), and would be distributed by
community councils (Wells, 1993: 164-5). However, problems with payments to
traditional owners continued. Wells reports that while ALPA has been honouring its
lease agreements since 1985, money often does not reach the traditional owners
(1993: 165). She notes that councils have been in the invidious position of not
having enough money to provide services and yet being in charge of distributing
money to traditional owners. As a consequence payments to traditional owners
were often not made. Moreover, in some communities there is a conflict as to
whose land the community store is actually on, making distribution of rent to
traditional owners even more difficult (1993: 165).
Labour costs
Another factor that may affect the cost structure of businesses in remote
communities is the cost of getting qualified labour. These supposedly high labour
costs are used to justify high prices. Deloittes’ data indicate that the direct wage
and salaries costs faced by stores in their sample was approximately 12 per cent of
average annual turnover. In addition to stipulated wage costs managers also incur
‘additional expenses’ and ‘travel and accommodation’ costs although these are
reasonably small relative to average annual turnover. Together these costs, in
addition to the costs of wages and salaries, bring the labour costs of an average
community store in the Deloittes sample to 13.2 per cent of average annual
turnover in the years 1995, 1998 and 2000 (see table 1). However, data gathered
during fieldwork indicate that in some cases wage costs associated with
community stores may be much higher, and in one case made up as much as 40
per cent of annual turnover. Such high labour costs may reflect overstaffing or may
indicate that some managers of stores with a large degree of market power inflate
staffing costs by paying themselves (and often other family members) large
salaries, and then either increase prices or return a lower profit to the community.
Part of the labour cost associated with the operation of community stores may be
in the hiring of Aboriginal labour. Community stores are an important source of
employment opportunities for Aboriginal people located in remote areas. In
relation to this point Young et al. write:
The issue of Aboriginal employment in the stores, particularly at those levels demanding
higher levels of skill and more responsibility, is of key importance … Store work … gives
people skills which are transferable to other key areas, such as working in the council or
school office, or running another type of business (1993: 8).
56 Competition and consumer issues for Indigenous Australians
c h a p t e r 3
Table 3. Employment characteristics of remote stores in the
Northern Territory, 2000
District East Alice Total no.
Darwin Katherine Arnhem  Springs Barkly  of stores
Stores with no
Aboriginal employees 1 5 1 0 3 10
Aboriginal employees 97 55 67 6 12 237
Total employees 133 106 96 16 46 397
Total stores surveyed 14 21 6 6 9 56
Source: THS 2000.
In spite of the level of Aboriginal employment detailed in table 3, none of the
stores surveyed during fieldwork in central Australia appeared to employ
Aboriginal workers. During interviews a number of store managers express
reservations about using Aboriginal labour. These included that Aboriginal workers
did not turn up for work and, in particular, that they were tardy or often absent
from shifts or away from work on ceremonial business for long periods of time. In
addition it was commented that ‘training was an ongoing problem because
Aboriginal people were not really interested in working in the store’, and that
cultural obligations (such as the demand sharing obligations discussed above) also
presented problems when hiring Aboriginal workers.
Key findings
The key findings of this chapter that have implications for ACCC compliance and
education strategies are as follows:
! Consumers need to be aware of the TPA and the obligations it imposes on
businesses before they can take action if there has been a breach. The
fieldwork and literature review indicate that neither Aboriginal consumers nor
Aboriginally operated businesses have much understanding of the TPA and
how it operates. This suggests that a directed consumer education strategy
may be needed. In addition, the ACCC may wish to become more involved in
proactive monitoring of TPA breaches that impact upon Aboriginal consumers.
It appears that a number of remote stores utilise Aboriginal labour. Table 3 details
the employment characteristics of community stores in the Northern Territory in
2000. Of the 56 stores surveyed, only ten reported that they did not employ any
Aboriginal staff. Further, the stores in the survey reported that approximately
60 per cent of all staff employed were Aboriginal.
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! Another finding of this research has been the diversity of experience of
Aboriginal consumers and businesses. This must be taken into account when
designing consumer education materials for Aboriginal people.
! Community stores are the main socioeconomic institution in many remote
Aboriginal communities. The way in which community stores are operated,
and their corresponding pricing policy, have a dramatic impact on the welfare
of their host populations. For this reason it is strongly recommended that the
code of conduct developed for community stores be supported both through
monitoring and through TPA compliance education for store managers.
! Governance is identified as a major issue for enhancing Aboriginal welfare in
remote communities. While not an ACCC responsibility, the way stores and
Aboriginal communities are governed has clear implications for consumer
rights and the general welfare of Aboriginal consumers. For this reason this
chapter recommends that the ACCC become involved in developing a TPA-
related education program for store committees and other peak Aboriginal
governing bodies.
! The ACCC must recognise that there is a gulf between Aboriginal cultural and
non-Aboriginal legal understandings and expectations about how stores should
operate. Store committees and local councils have to balance the obligations
imposed upon them by both the cultural context in which they operate and the
general Australian legal system. While these obligations are not always in
conflict, they must be recognised before any changes can be made to the way
store committees currently operate.
! The cost of freight and labour may not be major impediments to the operation
of stores in remote Aboriginal communities. By contrast, it appears that the
ALRA may present something of a legislative barrier to the operation of
competitive markets in remote Aboriginal communities. However, there are
very strong public interest arguments that militate against the erosion of
existing land rights legislation.
! Market sharing arrangements may be taking place amongst community stores
in remote Aboriginal communities. This seems to indicate the need for TPA
compliance education to be directed specifically at store managers.
! Understanding of Aboriginal agency must inform any action taken by the
ACCC for breaches of the TPA. It is important to recognise that it is not
necessarily through lack of education that Aboriginal consumers are
participating in what are perceived by others to be exploitative transactions.
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Implications for ACCC compliance and
education strategies
Questions remain as to when the ACCC should take action over breaches of the
TPA that impact upon Aboriginal consumers. A suggestive analogy may lie in the
operations of the Northern Territory Liquor Licensing Commission in remote areas.
There are numerous analyses of Aboriginal alcohol consumption patterns which
suggest that some of the underlying factors relate to particular distinctive
Aboriginal values and practices (e.g. Brady 1991; d’Abbs et al. 1994; Martin
1998). The Commission has adopted a highly proactive and best-practice program,
in consultation with community organisations, in order to reduce harmful drinking
practices by a variety of mechanisms. Measures include limiting opening times to
avoid periods when people receive their pays or pensions, restricting takeaway
sales in various ways, negotiating voluntary agreements with publicans, and
instituting local and regional controls over the times and types of alcohol sales.
That is, the Commission has recognised the particular vulnerability of Aboriginal
people—both drinkers and non-drinkers—to the problems occasioned by excessive
alcohol consumption, even from sales practices which are not in technical breach
of the relevant statutes.
The analysis in this chapter suggests a number of options that the ACCC may wish
to consider so as to further enhance the welfare of Aboriginal people in remote
communities. We return now to the concept of the frontier economy, defined as
the zone of intersection between the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal domains (see
fig. 1). This chapter has attempted to take account of specific economic practices
of both Aboriginal businesses (exemplified by Aboriginal community stores) and
Aboriginal consumers. In accordance with the research aims of this project, these
economic practices inform the ‘special characteristics of Aboriginal communities
which … should be taken into account in any ACCC compliance and education
strategies’.
Details of possible breaches of the TPA in remote Aboriginal communities are
contained in appendix 2. Evaluation of prospective breaches of the TPA requires a
culturally informed understanding of why Aboriginal people may continue to
participate in relationships that have the potential to be exploitative. Designing
appropriate compliance and consumer education strategies requires an
understanding of specific Aboriginal economic values and the way these values
may inform market transactions (see fig. 4). Sales practices that might be
potentially unconscionable in terms of the TPA, for example, might result in part
from Aboriginal agency, or suit particular Aboriginal purposes. The case study
detailed in relation to this point was that of a pastoral station store. An important
question that arises from this analysis is what the role of the ACCC should be in
such circumstances. If particular sales practices suit Aboriginal customers, should
they be left as they are?
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Proactive monitoring and intervention
In a recent article on the sale of alcohol using book-up, a journalist noted that ‘it’s
difficult to get people to make complaints because they are complicit in the whole
thing’ (Martin 2002). Similarly, the small number of publicised investigations of
TPA breaches in remote Aboriginal communities is not indicative of the fact that no
TPA breaches are occurring (see appendix 2), but rather the fact that such
breaches may go unreported. The Chairman of the ACCC, Professor Allan Fels,
himself noted at a recent conference that he is aware that Aboriginal people
seldom complain to bodies like the ACCC: ‘There are reasons for this related to
disadvantage, culture and access’ (Fels, 2002: 4). Possible reasons include a lack of
awareness of the TPA coupled with the difficulty in accessing a phone in remote
communities, and low levels of literacy. To some extent these factors must impede
on the operation of the TPA in remote Aboriginal Australia.
In the long term the measure of the success of ACCC programs directed to
Indigenous Australians may be the number of complaints received from Indigenous
people. However, in the short term, if reliance on complaints and feedback from
Aboriginal consumers is unlikely to be effective, then this suggests a need for
alternative strategies. In particular it suggests that the ACCC should become more
proactive in monitoring and intervening in Aboriginal TPA-related issues. Many
remote communities operate in a legislative vacuum, away from the purview of the
law. In this context it becomes increasingly important for regulatory agencies to
develop ways of monitoring the activities of firms and individuals, particularly with
respect to consumer rights issues. Ideally this would involve direct field monitoring.
While it is recognised that state and territory fair trading agencies generally deal
Fig. 4. Designing appropriate compliance and consumer
education strategies
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with localised consumer matters, fieldwork would suggest that these departments
are not funded to proactively monitor matters arising in remote communities. In
addition, it appears that a number of Aboriginal consumer issues, such as
unconscionable used-car and door-to-door sales practices and letter scams, are of
concern in a large number of Aboriginal communities. Such systemic problems
seem to indicate that a federal approach, or a federally directed approach, is
needed. It may therefore be that direct field monitoring is best performed by
agents of the ACCC. There are, however, obvious resource implications from such
an option.
Strategic linkages
One way of avoiding some of the costs of direct monitoring of TPA breaches in
remote Aboriginal communities would be to develop strategic linkages with key
Aboriginal agencies. This would allow potential breaches to be reported by these
agencies rather than via Aboriginal consumers themselves. While some linkages
between ATSIC and the ACCC have already been established, it is important that
regional linkages are also explored. Regional Aboriginal agencies are best placed to
collect information relating to prospective breaches of the TPA in remote
Aboriginal communities. Thus the ACCC may wish to pursue linkages with various
ATSIC regions as well as other regional Aboriginal agencies such as Land Councils
and Aboriginal legal aid organisations. Consumer education strategies should also
be directed towards these agencies.
The ACCC may also wish to consider taking a more proactive coordinating role in
the activities of the various state and territory fair trading agencies with respect to
issues of concern to Aboriginal people. At present there seems to be a large degree
of duplication in Aboriginal-related issues and in the materials being developed by
the various agencies. In addition, while many agencies have identified some key
issues that impact upon Aboriginal consumers, for example the sale of used cars,
they have not developed any strategic programs, beyond limited education of
Aboriginal consumers, to avoid such problematic transactions occurring in the
future. Further, many of the key Aboriginal consumer protection issues identified in
the Appendix to this chapter, such as the sale of used cars and door-to-door sales,
are issues that have also been identified by a number of state and territory fair
trading agencies. It is clear that these issues extend across state borders, indicating
that there may be a role for the ACCC in coordinating a federal response to
consumer protection measures in these areas.
Consumer education
Another aspect of the coordinating role that the ACCC may wish to pursue is the
development of Aboriginal-specific consumer education material. Much of the
material that is currently aimed at Aboriginal people is inaccessible to them, in that
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it is written in complex English. None of these materials appear to have been
developed in consultation with Aboriginal people or communities. Nor does it
appear that any of agencies concerned conduct extensive oral workshops on
consumer education in communities.
The key to an understanding of Aboriginal agency is the realisation that it is not
only through lack of education that Aboriginal consumers participate in what are
perceived by others to be exploitative transactions. The argument made in this
chapter would suggest that while general consumer education materials in
appropriate formats may have utility, it would be far more effective to provide
targeted information to, for example, the committees and boards of community
stores, community councils, and other relevant Aboriginal organisations. Peak
Aboriginal governing bodies have little or no understanding of how the TPA
operates. One way of ameliorating this problem may be to conduct a corporate
governance program with these bodies that includes, among other things, a
section on the operation of the TPA.
Another group that the ACCC may wish to consider targeting for TPA training are
the store managers of community stores. Since most store managers are non-
Aboriginal and literate there would probably be no need to develop specific
competition and consumer materials. This training could be viewed as important to
ensuring compliance with the competition and consumer provisions of the ‘store
charter’ (detailed below). Further, the presence of market-sharing arrangements in
community stores also seem to indicate the need for TPA compliance education to
be directed at store managers. Materials could be provided to accompany the store
charter and the ACCC could take steps to ensure that store managers understood
what they were signing on to.
By contrast, the preferred model for the delivery of general TPA competition and
consumer education material for Aboriginal groups is orally based communication
in the context of workshops, ideally given by an Aboriginal person who travels to
the community (Aboriginal Consumer Education Project 1994). Pictorial
representations are essential given the high level of Aboriginal illiteracy, and where
English is used it should be plain and concise. More generally, the ACCC may also
wish to look at employing a radio media outlet (such as Warlpiri Media) to design a
consumer education program. Such a program would have the advantage of being
a reasonably inexpensive and highly accessible means to raise awareness in remote
Aboriginal Australia. Finally, if a telephone line is to be the point of contact for
people accessing information from either the ACCC or various state fair trading
agencies, as is usually the case, then the number should be a ‘freecall’ number and
staff should be trained to use plain English. The ACCC may also wish to investigate
the idea of employing Aboriginal liaison officers to follow up complaints from
various communities. This would be in keeping with the idea of proactive
monitoring detailed above.
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Governance issues
Governance of stores is identified as a major issue for enhancing Aboriginal
welfare in remote communities. While not denying the importance of introducing
or maintaining a degree of competition, in and of itself competition cannot fully
enhance consumer welfare while governance structures remain as they are.
While it is not a ACCC responsibility, the way stores are governed has clear
implications for consumer rights and the general welfare of Aboriginal consumers.
Key to the governance problems faced by most community stores is a lack of
accountability. One possibility for improving accountability is the development of
Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) between the ACCC, the regulatory
authorities of the various statutes under which stores are incorporated and possibly
ATSIC, to develop systematic education and monitoring processes for store
committees. Thus, the ACCC has had an MoU in place with state and territory fair
trading agencies and ASIC for some time. A further such alliance has also been
pursued in relation to the development of a ‘store charter’ (discussed below).
These alliances may prove useful in both educating other agencies about the work
of the ACCC as well as developing mechanisms to better monitor the operation of
community stores.
Codes of conduct
Development of a code of conduct by which stores operate may be useful in
ensuring that a minimum standard of service and perhaps quality of goods is
maintained. Such a code of conduct, termed a ‘store charter’, has recently been
drafted by the ACCC in conjunction with a group consisting of the Banking
Industry Ombudsman (Colin Neave), the Northern Territory Anti-Discrimination
Commissioner (Tom Stodulka), the Northern Territory Department of Industries and
Business CEO (John Carroll) and ATSIC regional staff. Fieldwork investigations
seem to indicate that a number of stores do not display prices for goods. Thus it is
particularly important that the code requires that prices be included either on
goods or on the shelves where goods are stored. This is recognised in the store
charter which states that, ‘stores will clearly display the price of all items available
for sale’ (ACCC 2002: 4).
The development of a voluntary code of conduct may be ineffective if not
accompanied by both monitoring and the education of store managers in TPA
compliance. If after a period of time the voluntary code of conduct is deemed
ineffective then a mandatory code may be necessary. The dependence of large
sections of the community on the services provided by community stores seems to
indicate that the provision of these services should be regulated so as to ensure
that minimum standards are maintained. This is particularly the case where
community stores exercise a large degree of market power such that entry into a
voluntary code of conduct does not provide a competitive advantage in a market.
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Some evidence suggests that in a situation of market power customers who do
complain about, for example, higher prices, are refused service at the store
(Srivastava 1998). In the long run, a mandatory code may be the only means of
enabling Aboriginal consumers to exercise their consumer rights. However, even a
mandatory code would be ineffective if it were unpoliced. For example, despite the
existence of detailed health regulations there is still anecdotal evidence to suggest
that some community stores continue to sell stock that is unfit for human
consumption. Finally, if a mandatory code is established there must be some way
of attempting to ensure that it does not further increase the prices paid by
consumers at community stores. Without such an assurance it may be that
consumer welfare in remote Aboriginal communities will be further eroded.
